Retail Internet connectivity is a composite commodity made up by complementary inputs. While Internet connection into each single home (local access) necessarily is provided locally, other complementary inputs are offered globally by vertically integrated profit maximizing firms that often have the ability to use non-price foreclosure tools. We analyse the regulatory interplay between a country that exports essential input components and a country that imports these goods. As a point of departure, one may expect that price regulation of these goods will benefit importing countries. However, we show that this need not be true. On the contrary, welfare in the importing country may fall subsequent to price regulation, despite the fact that the non-price foreclosure tools will not be used towards this country.
Introduction
Historically, the primary task of telecommunications firms has been to transmit telephone calls between end-users. These firms were typically considered to be natural monopolies, not least because of the high sunk costs required to provide physical connection into each single home (local access). Entry into the telecommunications sector has therefore been regulated, and in most countries we found legal telecommunications monopolies (like British Telecom in the UK) with prices set by the public sector.
An important change that has taken place in the telecommunications sector is that the entry control largely is abolished. Indeed, since the privatization of British Telecom under Thatcher in 1985, competition has been encouraged. However, the local access network in each country still seems to constitute a natural (though no longer legal) monopoly. In order to provide competition the telecommunications incumbents are therefore required to sell local access as an input to competitors at regulated prices.
A second important change is that a large share of the telephone traffic is now related to the Internet. Along with this, we have seen a convergence between IT, telecommunications and media. Thus, global media and IT firms that control essential Internet inputs might also gain market power in national telecommunications markets.
The Internet is often described as having a layered network structure as illustrated in Figure 1 . In the bottom layer we find the physical infrastructure, where local and global access are essential inputs, and in the higher layers we have applications and content.
Physical infrastructure (local access, global access…)
Applications (IP telephony, video…) Content (media, broadcasting, e-commerce,…) Figure 1: The layered Internet structure.
Global access is supplied by Global Backbone Providers (GBPs), and is an essential input because it provides access to applications and content on an international level. This input used to be controlled by a few American firms like WorldCom, and most of the Internet traffic had to go through the USA. This raised a fear in Europe that the GBPs would abuse their market power to set high global access prices. Moreover, as these firms integrated vertically into the retail markets in order to sell Internet connection directly to consumers, there has also been a concern that they would reduce the quality of the global access input sold to downstream competitors. Both the European and the US authorities were concerned about non-price foreclosure in the global backbone market related to the merger between MCI and WorldCom in 1998 and the proposed merger between WorldCom and Sprint in 2000 (see Cremer, Rey and Tirole, 2000, and Cave and Mason, 2001 ).
Recent industry reviews by Oftel (2001) and OECD (2002) indicate that Europe's dependence on American backbones is reduced, since intermediate European backbones now take care of a larger part of the intra-European traffic.
1 Instead we find that some European countries are net exports of backbone services, while others are importers. In this sense European countries have become more asymmetric. As we argue below, this may affect the optimal telecom regulation policy in various ways.
What about market power in other Internet layers? The entry barriers for conventional narrowband Internet content have been low, but with the introduction 1 See also Laffont (2001a Laffont ( , 2001b and Kende (2000) .
of broadband we will probably see content segments for premium sport and enter- This gives rise to large flexibility and discretion at the hand of national authorities.
The national authorities will have some discretion to decide both which segments should be regulated and how restrictive the regulation should be.
In this paper we analyze whether the convergence between IT, media and telecom affects the optimal scope and restrictiveness of telecom regulation, and whether the intra-European asymmetry may give rise to strategic regulation policy between national authorities. As in Crémer, Rey and Tirole (2000) we make the assumption that the firms which provide services (upstream goods) that are complementary to local access have the ability use non-price foreclosure towards downstream rivals.
Consistent with WTO agreements, we also assume that regulated prices must be non-discriminatory. In our context, this means that if a country regulates the price of an upstream good, then the price of that good must be the same domestically as abroad.
We show that the convergence process increases the optimal scope of telecom regulation. Specifically, we show that a country which produces an upstream good has an incentive to regulate the price of that service. This is true even though regulation implies that the export price must be the same as the domestic price of the good. The regulated price is, as one may expect, lower the more expensive it is for an upstream producer to use the non-price foreclosure tool. As a point of departure one may also expect that the price regulation of the upstream good benefits the importing countries. However, we show that this need not be true.
On the contrary, we show that welfare in the importing country falls subsequent to price regulation of the imported good unless it is expensive to use the non-price foreclosure tool. This happens despite the fact that non-price foreclosure towards foreign downstream rivals will never be used in equilibrium. Finally, we find that the regulation game between the countries leads to sort of prisoner's dilemma that is well-known from the literature on strategic trade policy; world welfare would have been higher if the countries co-operated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The formal model is presented in 
The model
The market structure is illustrated in Figure 1 , where we use capital letters for country I and small letters for country II. Each country hosts one local access provider (LAP in country I and lap in country II) and two retailers (R 1 and R 2 in country I and r 1 and r 2 in country II). Additionally, there is one upstream firm (UF ) that supplies an essential service to the retailers. This firm is located in, and owned by, residents of country I. The retailers use one unit local access and one unit of the upstream good to produce one unit of the consumer good. End users End users Denote by X i the output of retailer R i and by x i the output of retailer r i . Let X ≡ X 1 + X 2 and x ≡ x 1 + x 2 , and assume that the inverse demand curves faced by the retailers in the two countries are given by P = α − βX and p = α − βx.
(
The retailers in country I are charged U and L for the upstream input and for local access, respectively. The retailers in country II are similarly charged u and l.
Assuming that these are the only costs incurred by the retailers, we may write the profit levels of the downstream units of the vertically integrated UF as
As in Foros, Kind and Sørgard (2002a) we assume that the upstream firm is able to reduce the quality of the input it sells to the retailers. 4 The profit levels of the rival retailers are given by
We interpret Q ≥ 0 (q ≥ 0) as a quality reduction parameter, which is such that one unit increase in Q (q) reduces the consumers' willingness to pay for the service provided by retailer R 1 (r 2 ) by one unit.
For simplicity we assume that the marginal production costs of the upstream firm are also equal to zero. However, imposing quality reduction is costly to the firm, which has an upstream profit level equal to
where φ ≥ 0.
The integrated upstream firm thus has a total profit equal to
The profitability of providing local access in the two countries equals
which means that the total profits of the vertically integrated local access providers are
Welfare Using equation (1) we may write consumer surplus as
Welfare in each country equals the sum of domestic consumer surplus and profit of the domestic firms;
Equilibrium quantities and quality levels
Independent of whether some of the prices are regulated, we shall assume that there is Cournot competition between the integrated upstream firm and the integrated local access providers in the last stage. Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2001) show that Cournot is a realistic assumption in the retail market for broadband Internet connectivity. The countries constitute two segmented markets, and solving
while the local access providers have downstream output equal to
In the second-last stage the upstream firm decides how much it will invest in quality degradation towards the rival retailers, and we assume that Q and q can be set independently of each other. To see how an increase in Q (an increase in q has a similar effect) affects the profitability of the vertically integrated upstream firm we note that:
The first square bracket reflects the fact that upstream profit falls subsequent to an increase in Q. This is true both because total output falls and because it is costly to reduce the quality (this shows that the upstream firm will always set Q = 0 unless it is vertically integrated). The second square bracket reflects the fact that a higher Q increases the downstream profit of firm UF , since its own subsidiary sells more and since the consumer rises due to reduced total output.
Setting ∂Π IU /∂Q = 0 = ∂Π IU /∂q we find the first-order conditions
Equation (12) holds if there is an interior solution, where the rival downstream firms are only partly foreclosed through quality degradation. In the appendix we show that this is the case if φ > 2/(3β). If φ < 2/(3β) degradation costs are so low that firm UF may completely foreclose its downstream rivals.
It is easily shown that the upstream firm will not invest in quality degradation (Q = q = 0) if it can maximize profit with respect to U and u. This is not surprising, since equations (10) and (11) show that a change in the quality levels has the same effect as a change in the prices of the upstream good (e.g., ∂X 1 /∂Q = ∂X 1 /∂U = 1/(3β) and ∂X 2 /∂Q = ∂X 2 /∂U = −2/(3β). Thereby it is more profitable for the firm to set a high price for the upstream good than to invest in quality degradation:
Remark 1 Assume that firm UF maximizes profit with respect both to quality degradation levels and the prices of the upstream good. Then it will set Q = q = 0.
As a benchmark, consider a free market economy where firm UF and the LAPs set the prices for the upstream good and for access to the local loop, respectively, at stage 1, and where there is Cournot competition at stage 2. In this case we find L = l = U = u = 5α/11 and that welfare in the two countries equals
3 Regulation of local access prices only
The prevailing regulation regime
The prevailing regulation regime in most countries is to set the local access prices equal to long-run incremental costs (L = l = 0). Most other telecommunications prices are unregulated, and in particular this is true for Internet related services like electronic content and backbone services.
With L = l = 0 it is straight forward to show that the consumer prices fall toP = α/2, compared toP = 7α/11 in the free market economy. However, the upstream firm will set U = u = α/2, which in turn implies that X 2 = x 2 = 0.
The vertically integrated upstream firm thus ends up as a monopolist in the enduser markets by setting a price of the upstream good that forecloses its downstream rivals. Inserting for the upstream and local access prices we find
Comparing equations (13) and (14) we see that welfare in country II is lower with than without regulation. The reason for this is that the upstream firm increases the prices U and u when the regulators set low prices for access to the local networks, reflecting the fact that firm UF provides a good that is complementary to local access in each country. The low local access prices in the regulated economy thus leads to a profit shift from the LAPs to firm UF . This profit shift affects country II negatively, since firm UF is owned by residents of country I :
Remark 2 Assume that local access prices are cost-based (L = l = 0), while the prices for the upstream good are unregulated. Then welfare in country II is lower than in a free market economy.
This result is well known from the literature, and is robust to assumptions of product differentiation and of whether we have Cournot competition or Bertrand competition (see Sørgard 2002a, 2002b) .
Optimal regulation of local access prices
The fact that cost-based regulation of local access prices leads to lower welfare than in a free market economy for country II indicates that this regulation regime is inoptimal. Consider therefore the following game:
Stage 1: The regulators in country I and II set L and l, respectively.
Stage 2: The upstream firm sets (U, u) and (Q, q)
Stage 3: Cournot competition in each end-user market Consistent with the regulation policy in most countries, we shall assume that the local access providers are not required to sell access at a price that is lower than their long-run incremental costs:
The solution to the last stage is given by equations (10) and (11). Setting 
Note that ∂U/∂L < 0 and ∂u/∂l < 0, so that the price of the upstream good is higher the lower the local access prices. As noted above, this reflects the complementarity between the two inputs used by the retailers.
The regulator in country I maximizes domestic welfare with respect to L. The first-best policy would be to set L so low that the price for Internet access is equal to the domestic resource costs, P = 0. This is easily found to imply that L = −5α/3 < 0, which is a violation of assumption 1. Maximizing W with respect to L, subject to the restriction L ≥ 0, we thus find that the (constrained) optimal value of local access in country I is L = 0. The prevailing regulation regime is thus optimal for country I.
The regulator in country II maximizes domestic welfare with respect to l, from which we find that l = 35α/99. The upstream firm subsequently sets u = 46α/99, 5 The second-order conditions are equal to ∂ 2 Π IU /∂U 2 = ∂ 2 Π IU /∂u 2 = −10/(9β) < 0, and thus always satisfied.
and both retailers in country II will have positive outputs (x 1 , x 2 > 0). The regulator thus sets a high price for local access in order to force firm UF to reduce the price of the upstream good.
Inserting for the input prices we find W = 1465 2904 α 2 β and w = 37 198
and we have the following result:
Proposition 1: Assume that the vertically integrated upstream firm sets the prices U and u. In this case the regulator in country I sets a cost-based local access price ( L = 0), while the regulator in country II sets a local access price above marginal costs ( l > 0). Welfare in both countries are higher than in a free market economy.
The fact that the regulator in country I sets L = 0 implies that U = α/2 and X 2 = 0. Thus, firm UF forecloses its domestic downstream rival by setting a high price for the upstream good. The reason why it would be inoptimal for UF to foreclose its downstream rival in country II (x 2 > 0 in equilibrium), is that the relatively high local access price in that country makes the vertically integrated lap appear as a low-cost producer. Foreclosing that firm would excessively reduce demand for the upstream good:
Corollary 1 Suppose that the local access prices are optimally regulated. In this case it is optimal for firm UF to foreclose its domestic downstream rival, but not its foreign downstream rival.
Regulation of the price of the upstream good
The fact that a low price for local access is partly offset by a higher price for the upstream good is an argument for regulating also this price. However, international agreements (like WTO) require non-discrimination, which implies that if country I chooses to regulate the price of the upstream good, then the price must be the same for the domestic and the foreign retailer. We will use the common symbol U for this price.
As above, we assume that the regulators can credibly commit themselves in their regulation policy. At stage 1 the regulator in country I therefore sets L and U, and the regulator in country II sets l. We also maintain the assumption that the upstream firm chooses the quality degradation levels at stage 2, and that there is Cournot competition in the end-user markets at the final stage. The Cournot quantities are still given by equations (10) and (11), except that we must replace u with U.
Low costs of degrading the quality (φ < 2/(3β))
When the degradation costs are sufficiently low, the vertically integrated upstream firm either completely forecloses at least one of its downstream rivals through quality degradation or does not invest in quality degradation at all. In the appendix we show that the equilibrium when φ < 2/(3β) is that the firm UF forecloses its domestic rival but not its foreign rival. We thus have
where the latter is found by setting X 2 = 0 in equation (10).
At stage 1 the governments simultaneously solve the problems max U,L W and max l w subject to (10), (11), (17) and Assumption 1 (that access prices are non-negative).
It is easily proved that the first-best for the government in country I is to set L < 0. Thereby the consumer price in country I will be relatively low, despite the fact that the vertically integrated upstream firm is a monopolist in this market.
However, an access price below marginal costs violates assumption 1. Therefore the constraint L = 0 is binding. Moreover, given that the upstream firm's domestic rival is foreclosed, the value of U does not affect the domestic consumer price -with L = 0 firm UF chooses the monopoly price P = α/2 in the domestic consumer market.
Thus, it is equivalent to maximize profit for the vertically integrated upstream firm and welfare for the government in country I.
Differentiating W with respect to U and w with respect to l we find that l = l * = α/3 in equilibrium and that
Equation (18) shows that the regulator in country I must balance two opposing effects when setting the value of U . In particular, the first term shows that the profit flow from the foreign country is maximized if U = 7α/15. Inserting this into equations (10) and (11) we find that both x 1 and x 2 are greater than zero. A higher value on U would increase the downstream profit earned from country II, but this gain would be dominated by reduced upstream profit. Thus, as we should expect from Corollary 1, it is not optimal for the regulator in country I to choose a value of U which forecloses UF 's downstream rival r 2 in country II.
The second term in (18) shows that the quality degradation costs are minimized if U = α/2. Indeed, with this value of U we see from equation (17) that the upstream firm does not need to invest in quality degradation to foreclose its domestic rival.
However, setting U = α/2 would mean that also the rival retailer r 2 in country II is foreclosed through the price on the upstream good. That would not be optimal for the regulator (or the upstream firm). Thus, the optimal value of U is between 7α/15 and α/2. Moreover, since the second term in the first-order condition is more important the higher is φ, we should also expect U to be increasing in φ. This is confirmed by solving equation (18), from which we find
Inserting for U * into (17) we further have
An increase in φ makes it more costly to invest in quality degradation. The regulator will therefore set a higher value of U the larger is φ, in order to reduce the upstream firm's need to invest in quality reduction. This explains why ∂U * /∂φ > 0 and ∂Q * /∂φ < 0.
Inserting for (19) and (20) we can express the equilibrium welfare levels as
329φβ + 366 (10 + 9φβ) and w * = α 2 24β 792φβ + 351φ 2 β 2 + 448
Recall that the consumer price in country I equals P = α/2 when the vertically integrated upstream firm completely forecloses its domestic downstream rival, and is thus independent of quality degradation costs. However, higher degradation costs lower the profitability of the upstream firm. Therefore both welfare and profits in country I is decreasing in φ (∂W/∂φ = ∂Π IU /∂φ < 0).
Interestingly, even though firm UF does not foreclose its foreign downstream rival, welfare in country II is also decreasing in the quality degradation costs φ (i.e., ∂w/∂φ < 0). This is true for two reasons, which both hinge on the fact that U is increasing in φ. First, a higher value of U reduces the profits of retailer r 2 (the downstream unit of the lap). Second, the higher marginal costs of retailer r 2 increases the consumer price p.
Summing up, we have:
Proposition 2: Suppose that φ < 2/(3β) and that the regulator in country I sets L and U, while the regulator in country II sets l. Then the vertically integrated upstream firm prefers not to foreclose its foreign downstream rival ( q = 0; x 2 > 0), but invests in quality degradation that completely forecloses its domestic rival ( Q > 0; X 2 = 0). The welfare levels in both countries are decreasing in φ.
Since U is increasing in φ the output of retailer r 2 is decreasing in φ, and makes the firm less competitive. The value of U does, however, not influence the costs of the downstream unit r 1 in country II of firm UF . In the appendix we thus show that Corollary 2 Suppose that φ < 2/(3β). The output of retailer r 1 is then increasing in φ, while the output of retailer r 2 is decreasing in φ.
High costs of degrading the quality (φ > 2/(3β))
If φ > 2/(3β) it is too expensive for the vertically integrated upstream firm to completely foreclose its domestic rival, which means that X 2 > 0. In this case
we have ∂U/∂φ < 0. In words, the more expensive it is to foreclose the domestic rival through quality degradation, the lower will the regulator in country I set the upstream price (see appendix). This reflects the fact that an increase in φ reduces the upstream firm's profitability of imposing quality degradation, and allows the regulator to reduce the upstream price. In the appendix we further show the following:
Proposition 3: Suppose that φ > 2/(3β) and that the regulator in country I sets the price of the upstream good. In this case the vertically integrated upstream firm prefers not to foreclose its foreign downstream rival ( q = 0; x 2 > 0), and only partly forecloses its domestic rival ( Q > 0; X 2 > 0) through quality degradation.
The welfare levels in both countries are increasing in φ.
In the limit, as φ approaches infinity, we have U = α/3. This is the same value as the regulator in country II sets for local access (l = α/3). World welfare would increase if the countries agreed on U = l = 0, but both countries have incentives to set higher prices in order to steal profit from each other. 6 The countries thus end up in a kind of prisoner's dilemma that is well-known from the literature on strategic trade policy (see Brander and Spencer, 1984 and Brander, 1995) .
Finally, Proposition 4 provides the answer to the main question we have asked in this paper: What are the welfare effects of regulating the price of the essential upstream good?
Proposition 4: Suppose that the regulator in country I sets the price of the upstream good, U . This increases welfare in country I compared to the case where U is unregulated , but reduces welfare in country II if φ <φ ≈ 3/(4β).
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 2 . The horizontal curve labelled "U unregulated" measures welfare in country II if the price of the upstream good is determined by firm UF (c.f. equation (16)), while the curve labelled "U regulated" measures welfare in country II if the upstream price is regulated. If φ is "large", the upstream firm has weak incentives to invest in quality degradation. Thus, the regulator in country I enforces a strict price regulation. This is to the benefit of country II, which consequently has higher welfare with than without regulation of U if φ >φ.
For "low" values of φ, on the other hand, the upstream firm has strong strategic incentives to invest in quality degradation. Given that this harmful strategy cannot be prevented, the best the regulator in country I can do is to allow the upstream firm to charge a relatively high upstream price. This is detrimental to country II, and implies that it has a lower welfare level with than without regulation if φ <φ. 
Appendix
Equilibrium if φ < 2/(3β) and U is regulated for sufficiently low values of φ firm UF either sets Q = 0 (q = 0) or choose Q (q) such that there is complete foreclosure; X 2 = 0 (x 2 = 0). We now have to analyze four different cases; that UF imposes quality degradation in both countries, in just one of them, or in none.
Case i: Quality degradation in both countries.
Suppose that the regulators expect that the upstream firm will completely forecloses its downstream rival in each country, and thus choose quality degradation levels Q and q such that X 2 = x 2 = 0. From equation (11) we then have
Solving max U,L W and max l w subject to (22) we find l = α/3, L = 0 and U = 2α/3. The regulator in country II thus sets a local access price above long-run marginal costs (l = α/3 > 0) in order to capture some of UF 0 s profit potential in this country, even though this comes at the expense of relatively high consumer price. The regulator in country I, on the other hand, sets a low local access price (L = 0) in order to minimize the domestic deadweight loss. The profit shift to UF is of no concern, since the firm is owned by domestic residents.
Given that UF completely forecloses its downstream rivals, the value of U does not influence either consumer prices or the revenues of the firms. The regulator in country I should therefore set U such that the quality degradation costs are minimized. This is done by choosing U = 2α/3, since the rivals are then foreclosed even with Q = q = 0.
Inserting for l = α/3, L = 0 and U = 2α/3 we have
Case ii: No quality degradation in any country
Assume that the regulators expect that UF will not invest in quality degradation in any country (Q = q = 0). Given Assumption 1, it is then straight forward to show that the outcome of the first stage is L = 0, l = U = α/3. 
> 0 it is profitable for UF to invest in quality degradation. Thus, it is not rational for the regulators to expect Q = q = 0.
Case iii: Quality degradation only in Country I
Next, suppose that the regulators expect that UF will completely foreclose only its domestic rival, and not its foreign rival. We then have q = 0 and Q = This proves that the output of retailer r 1 increases in φ and the output of retailer r 2 decreases in φ if UF completely forecloses its domestic downstream rival through quality degradation, c.f. Corollary 2.
Equilibrium if φ ≥ 2/(3β) and U is regulated
It can be shown that firm UF will set q = 0 for all values of φ. This is intuitively obvious; since UF will not foreclose its foreign rival even when it is costless to do so, it will not impose quality reduction if it involves some costs either. 7 Moreover, for sufficiently high values of φ it is too expensive for UF to completely foreclose its domestic rival also. In that case the first-order condition ∂Π IU /∂Q implies (c.f.
equation (12))
The second-order condition is ∂ 2 Π I /(∂Q 2 ) = − (9φβ − 2) / (9β) . The quality reduction level Q is thus given by (25) if (9φβ − 2) > 0 for X i , x i , Q ≥ 0. It is now useful to define y = φβ. Inserting for this, and using equation (25), we now find that max U,L {W } and max l {w} implies that we in an equilibrium with only partial foreclosure (marked with a double asterix) have L * * = 0, l * * = α/3 and U * * = α 3 891y 2 + 522y − 376 891y 2 + 108y − 212 .
From this it further follows that X * * 2 = α 9β (y − 58/99) (y − 2/3) ³ y + (27) 7 A formal proof of this is available from the authors.
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which are both non-negative iff y ≥ 2/3, or φ ≥ 2/(3β). The vertically integrated upstream firm thus completely forecloses its domestic downstream rival through quality degradation if φ < 2/(3β), while it otherwise chooses only partial foreclosure. 
This proves Proposition 3. Comparing w * * with welfare when the upstream price is unregulated (equation (16)), we find that regulation of U increases welfare in country II iff φ >φ ≈ 0.75. This proves Proposition 4.
